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Article
The International Criminal Court, the United
States, and the Domestic Armed Conflict in
Syria
Eric Engle*
Abstract
This article reviews the various objections made by certain elements
to U.S. ratification of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and
considers alternatives to the ICC. Argues that criticisms of the ICC
are over-stated and can be answered decisively with good legal
arguments. The U.S. should continue its close cooperation with the
ICC and seek to ratify the ICC treaty as part of the U.S. pivot out of
the failed, expensive, unilateral, and lawless "global war on terror"
and toward a multilateral rule of law approach, which correctly
constructs terrorism as an illegal cowardly crime, and not an act of
war (and thus implicitly lawful if not heroic). This pivot enables the
U.S. to credibly call on aid from U.S. friends and allies, as well as
persuading possible allies and dissuading actual enemies.

*

Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany 2013.
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The International Criminal Court, the United
States, and the Domestic Armed Conflict in
Syria
Eric Engle
Introduction
The Rome Statute created the International Criminal Court.
The United States was one of the prime movers in the negotiation of
the Rome Statute. However, for a variety of political reasons, U.S.
accession to the Treaty was limited to signature and was not
followed up with domestic ratification to make the treaty directly
binding before U.S. courts. That is, the United States signed but did
not ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This
means that the U.S. has an international treaty obligation under the
Rome Statute of the ICC not to frustrate the purpose of the treaty,
which it has signed. However, it also means that any U.S. obligations
the treaty created are not domestically effective as a part of directly
enforceable U.S. law. The concerns that led to the non-ratification by
the United States may at the time have seemed legitimate. However,
the prudent practice of the ICC, as well as a changed international
landscape, shows that those concerns were warrantless. Furthermore,
the ICC can play a part in the pivot of U.S. foreign policy from failed
unilateralism, which is expensive, isolated, and ineffective, toward
confident multilateralist globalisation of the rule of law.
Consequently, the U.S. is engaging the International Criminal Court
and will continue to deepen its connections to that court.
The ICC presents an opportunity for multilateral globalisation
to strengthen human rights, as the eventual fall of the Assad regime
in Syria may well lead to trials at the ICC. This article argues that the
United States can and should seek to further empower the ICC by
making a bi-partisan domestic effort to ratify the Rome Statute.
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The International Criminal Court (ICC)
A. The ICC Generally

The International Criminal Court is not a formal organ of the
United Nations;1 it is an international organization created by an
international convention, the Rome Statute. Essentially, the Rome
Statute codifies various recent customary jus cogens crimes of war:2
genocide, systematic and sustained (as opposed to isolated and
individual)3 war crimes, crimes against humanity, and systematic
war-time rape4 (whether as motivation for soldiers or genocidal
tactic),5 all crimes included in the Rome Statute at the U.S.’ behest.6
The U.S. also successfully advocated for inclusion of war crimes
committed during domestic armed conflicts as a basis for ICC
jurisdiction during the negotiation of the Rome Statute7 under Article
8,8 as well as various crimes that occur outside of any armed
conflict.9

1

About the Court, INT’L CRIM CT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013);
Marten Zwanenburg, The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the
United States: Peacekeepers Under Fire?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 124, 130 (1999).
2
LT Aaron M. Riggio et al., The International Criminal Court and Domestic
Military Justice, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 99, 104 (2011).
3
David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 16 (1999).
4
Id. at 16-17.
5
Id. at 17 (“include[ing] as crimes against humanity (Article 7(1)(g)) and war
crimes (Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) and (e)(vii))” and "rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual
violence of significant magnitude”).
6
Id. at 16.
7
Id. at 14 ("Much debate ensued over whether crimes against humanity would
include crimes committed during an internal armed conflict and crimes occurring
outside any armed conflict (such as an internal wave of massacres). The United
States took the lead in advocating both of these propositions and issued a statement
during the session arguing that "contemporary international law makes it clear that
no war nexus for crimes against humanity is required.").
8
Id. at 16.
9
Id.
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B. ICC Jurisdiction
ICC jurisdiction is limited only to those serious and
systematic crimes which are of mutual and not merely several
concern to States:10 Article 13(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute provides
for ICC jurisdiction in cases:
(1) where a state party refers the case to the ICC prosecutor (referral
- including "self referral"),
(2) by resolution the U.N. Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, or
(3) by the Prosecutor's own motion (proprio motu).11
Furthermore,
A national of a state which is not a member of the ICC
can be subject to ICC jurisdiction in four different
situations: (1) if the person commits an ICC crime on
the territory of an ICC member state; (2) if the situation
is referred to the ICC by a S.C. resolution under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; (3) if the person's
home state (a non-party) accepts the jurisdiction of the
ICC and refers the case to the Court; or (4) if the ICC
crime is committed on the territory of a non-member
state, but the state with territorial jurisdiction accepts
the jurisdiction of the ICC and refers the case to the
Court."12
Only natural persons (as opposed to corporations or states)
10

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (stating that “[J]urisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”).
11
Justin H. Whitten, They're Getting Away With Murder: How the
International Criminal Court Can Prosecute U.S. Private Security Contractors for
the Nisour Square Tragedy and Why It Should, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 503, 509 (2012).
12
Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations with
the International Criminal Court During the Obama Administration, 22 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 155, 171 (2010).
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may be subjected to ICC jurisdiction.13 Heads of state do not enjoy
immunity before the ICC.14
ICC jurisdiction is “complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”15 That is, ICC jurisdiction is intended to cover only
places where there is no State power (the high seas, failed states) or
where no effective domestic prosecution is possible (whether due to
corruption or oppression).16 All these jurisdictional preconditions
mean that the ICC will likely be primarily a Security Council court.17
C. U.S. Accession to the Rome Statute
Although the U.S. has not ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC
was inspired by U.S. initiatives, and the U.S. was heavily involved in
the negotiations leading to the creation of the ICC. The Nuremburg
and Tokyo tribunals, which are among the inspirations of the ICC,
were essentially U.S. creations. At the end of the Cold War, U.S.
scholars18 and diplomats successfully argued for the implementation
of a permanent international criminal court at the United Nations.19
As a result, over 100 countries became parties to the Rome Statute.20
Like the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the
13

Id. at 159.
The ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIM CT.,
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2013).
15
Smith, supra note 12, at 159.
16
Id.
17
Riggio, supra note 2, at 106-107.
18
M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 11 (1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 443
(1999).
19
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. DOC. A/51/207 (Jan. 16,
1997) (“Decid[ing] further that a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries shall
be held in 1998, with a view to finalizing and adopting a convention on the
establishment of an international criminal court.”).
20
David H. Lim, Beyond Kampala: The U.S.' Role in Supporting the
International Criminal Court's Mission, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 441,
442-443 (2012); Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future
Of the International Criminal Court Through its Involvement in Libya, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2267, 2279 (2012); Smith, supra note 12, at 171.
14
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U.S. signed the ICC treaty,21 but never ratified that treaty.22 Legally
speaking, the United States is obligated as a matter of international
law to respect its commitments under the Rome Statute; however,
with no ratification, the treaty has no direct effect in domestic U.S.
law or before U.S. courts.23 International law does not obligate states
to transpose treaties they have signed into their domestic legal
order.24
Although the ICC and CRC treaties are not domestically
directly effective they create U.S. international obligations.
Furthermore, the ICC treaty, like the CRC, is taken by U.S. courts as
evidence of customary international law, whether as evincing opinio
juris or as evidence of state practice. Customary international law,
unlike treaty law, is directly effective in common law countries'
courts and does not require transposition or ratification to be applied
by U.S. judges. Thus, while the U.S. has no direct obligations under
the treaty before domestic courts, the treaty has persuasive
evidentiary value of the state of customary international law, and as
such, is evoked before U.S. courts. A similar situation, incidentally,
also occurred with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties25
and the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). The U.S. never
ratified those treaties, yet they are all evoked before U.S. courts26 as
codifications of customary international law, i.e. as evidence of
binding international law. Customary international law is binding
domestic law in the common law countries.
21

WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 28 (Cambridge, 4th ed. 2011).
22
Whitten, supra note 11, at 509; LAURA M. OLSEN, ET AL., U.S. POLICY
TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: FURTHERING POSITIVE
ENGAGEMENT, REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE, AM SOC’Y INT’L L. V
(2009).
23
See, e.g., id. at xi. .
24
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 83 (2000).
25
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify
International Criminal Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 2002), available at
http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm.
26
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2nd Cir. 2007);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding JCC evidence of accomplice liability as customary international
law).
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II. U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court
The U.S. has, at different times and to different extents, raised
a variety of objections to the ICC. These objections are analyzed
below and will be shown to be unpersuasive in law or in fact.
A. Inclusion of the Crime of Aggression
One recurrent but ill-founded U.S. criticism of the ICC Rome
Statute is its inclusion of an ambiguous and ill-defined27 crime of
aggression.28 The Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (IMT)
defined crimes against peace as “planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”29
Even if the substantive elements of the crime become clearer in that
light, the question of who exactly is to be held responsible for that
crime (the state? organs of state? the head of state? ministers?)
remain unanswered.30
The political critique of inclusion of the crime of aggression
is that its inclusion enables U.S. critics to argue that President
George W. Bush planned and committed a war of aggression against
Iraq to seize Iraqi oil. This illustrates the U.S. concern over frivolous
political accusations and the bases of such accusations. The price of
27

U.S. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, REVIEW
CONFERENCE, KAMPALA, UGANDA, MAY 31 – JUNE 11, 2010, S. DOC NO. 111-55, AT 8
(2d Sess. 2010) (“Defining aggression as [t]he planning, preparation, initiation, or
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its
character, gravity and scale, constitutes manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations,” and “[t]he use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”).
28
U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6, at 19 (June 11, 2010).
29
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, annex art.
VI(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
30
Chance Cammack, The Stuxnet Worm and Potential Prosecution by the
International Criminal Court Under the Newly Defined Crime Of Aggression, 20
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303, 304-305 (2011).
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unilateralism is the loss of legitimacy. Had President George W.
Bush pursued a multilateralist policy, as President George H. W.
Bush did, there would have been no question about U.S. motives in
Iraq. The price of unilateralism was also material: the economic costs
of the Second Gulf War run around a trillion dollars. In contrast, the
first gulf war was funded entirely by U.S. allies who were persuaded
that opposing the war-like dictator was in their own interests. George
H. W. Bush, due to multilateralism, obtained significant financial
and military support from U.S. allies, unlike George W. Bush.
The legal critique of the crime of aggression is that it violates
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege due to vagueness,31 overbreadth,32 and circularity.33 Namely, it is unclear what conduct is
covered (vagueness), too much conduct is covered (overbreadth), and
the reasons the conduct is covered are not adequately explained
(circularity: e.g., the conduct is prohibited because it is forbidden).
Thus, the legal critique is that the inclusion of the crime of
aggression violates the prohibition of ex post facto law
(Rückwirkung),34 although some contend these criticisms are overdone.35
The most cogent critique of the crime of aggression is
presented by Harold Hongju Koh. Koh states:
I think one fundamental point is that the crime of
aggression is different from the other three crimes in a
31

Riggio, supra note 2, at 110.
Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J.
INT'L L. 71, 74 (2010).
33
Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of
Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 421-36 (1999) (discussing
the Nuremberg Charter which allowed prosecution of individuals, and the U.N.
General Assembly's Resolution 3314 which defines as aggression acts of States).
34
Glennon, supra note 32, at 72.
35
Jennifer Trahan, A Meaningful Definition of the Crime of Aggression: A
Response to Michael Glennon, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 907, 909 (2012); Ian Hurd,
How Not to Argue Against the Crime of Aggression: A Response to Michael
Glennon 1, 6 (Buffett Ctr. for Int'l & Comp. Stu., Working Paper No. 10-001,
2010), available at
http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/Buffett_10001_Hurd.pdf.
32
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couple of respects . . . [t]here have been hundreds of
prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. There have only been two
prosecutions for wars of aggression, namely
Nuremberg and Tokyo. Both of those happened before
there was a UN system. There's been no successful
prosecution for an act of aggression alone. And the
question is, since we're making international criminal
law for the real world, before you lock in the crime
forever, you want to make sure that as a legal matter
you've got it right."36
Even if the substantive elements of the crime become clearer
in that light, the questions of who exactly is to be held responsible
for that crime remain unanswered.37
Although the criticism of the inclusion of the crime of
aggression is understandable, claims of aggression will not be
justiciable before 2017. During that time, the criticisms – and
adequate responses to them – can be developed. Furthermore, "the
[Rome] Statute allows a state that has ratified the Rome Statute to
exclude the Court's jurisdiction for acts of aggression committed by
its nationals simply by making a declaration to the ICC Registrar that
it does not accept the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression."38 Thus, U.S. citizens are exempt from aggression
jurisdiction.39
In sum, U.S. critiques of the inclusion of the crime of
aggression are ill-founded. Moreover, the inclusion of the crime of
aggression actually is not entirely bad for the U.S. Rather, it is in the
U.S.’ interest to develop an understanding of the meaning of
"aggression" because of the problem of "cyber warfare,"40 i.e. state
sponsored network disruption of telecommunications—actions which
36

Harold Hongju Koh & Stephen J. Rapp, US Engagement With The ICC and
The Outcome Of The Recently Concluded Review Conference, U.S. DEP’T ST.
(June 15, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us_ releases/remarks/143178.htm.
37
Cammack, supra note 30, at 304-305.
38
Smith, supra note 12, at 171.
39
Trahan, supra note 35, at 911.
40
See Cammack, supra note 30, at 303.
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both Russia (in Estonia in 2006) and China (more recently) have
been accused of, with some accuracy. Industrial espionage might
also qualify as aggression.
B. The ICC Prosecutor's Power to Prosecute on His or Her Own
Motion (Proprio Motu)
Another U.S. criticism of the Rome Statute was that it vests
prosecutorial power and discretion in a supposedly unaccountable
court. Namely, the ICC prosecutor may initiate prosecution by his or
her own motion (proprio motu). There were concerns that this
practice would lead to a flood of complaints41 and/or selective
politicized prosecutions.42 In practice, however, those fears have not
materialized and the court has behaved responsibly.43 The Court
checks prosecutorial power and defends due process rights.44 For
example, when confronted with the fact of isolated but literally grave
human rights violations by British soldiers, the ICC concluded that
the killings, which were terrible and did occur, were not sufficiently
systematic to overcome the presumption of complementarity: the
soldiers were better prosecuted by the Crown.45 It is thus extremely
unlikely that the ICC would ever try any U.S. citizen.46 This
criticism, like others, shows itself to be merely theoretical and in
practice unrealistic and unfounded.
C. The Absence of Jurisdiction over Terrorism
Another criticism of the ICC is that the Rome Statute does
not provide jurisdiction over acts of terrorism,47 not only because the
41

Zwanenburg, supra note 1, at 136.
See Riggio, supra note 2, at 112-14.
43
Smith, supra note 12, at 177.
44
Olsen, supra note 22.
45
Smith, supra note 12, at 169-170.
46
Id. at 177-178.
47
Aviv Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L L.
REV. 219, 223 (2012), available at
http://msuilr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Cohen-Macro-for-publisher-afterHazels-edits.pdf.
42
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crime of terrorism is so contentious and ill-defined under customary
international law,48 but also because the crime of terrorism is not one
of the core crimes that were of mutual concern to the States,
internationally.49 However, some have argued that terrorism is
analogous to piracy and by analogy should be seen as a customary
international crime.50 The crime of terrorism is prohibited by various
multilateral international treaties. Those treaties usually feature
extraterritorial jurisdiction, police cooperation clauses, and even
extradition provisions. The treaty-based crime of terrorism will likely
grow into customary international law. If it does, and as it does, the
concern that the Rome Statute does not expressly include terrorism
will fade. Alternatively, the Rome Statute might yet be amended to
include the international crime of terrorism.
D. The Democratic Legitimacy of the ICC
A more interesting critique of the ICC is its legitimacy in
terms of democratic input.51 That critique is related to claims that the
court is "neo-imperialist." However, it is not particularly realistic to
expect or demand democratic legitimation of international
institutions in failed states, which generally are the sources of
criminal defendants before the ICC.
Another argument about the legitimacy of the court is the fact
that citizens of non-signatory states may be called before the court.
However, the ICC claims jurisdiction only over natural persons, not
states or even corporations. Thus, non-party states are not bound by
the treaty. States take criminal jurisdiction over non-citizen natural
persons regularly, and that which is not forbidden to a state would
not be forbidden to an international organization created by states.52
For these reasons "the [U.S.] Task Force does not consider the ICC’s
48

Id. at 224 ("The first and foremost obstacle to the inclusion of terrorism in
the Rome Statute was the lack of a clear and universally accepted definition of
what constitutes terrorism, including dissatisfaction with the proposed definition in
the text of the draft.”).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 225.
51
See Marlies Glasius, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic
Legitimacy?, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 43 (2012).
52
Olsen, supra note 22, at ix.
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jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States to be in conflict with
principles of international law."53
E. The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute

Much of the criticism of the ICC from the U.S. perspective
focuses on constitutional concerns,54 such as due process or the
constitutional admissibility of a treaty in possible conflict with the
U.S. federal constitution.55 Thus, during negotiations, the U.S. put
serious effort into making sure that the Rome Statute would cohere
with the U.S. Constitution's due process requirements, notably in
Parts 5-8 of the treaty.56 U.S. critics of the ICC nevertheless argue
that the Rome Statute does not guarantee, e.g., the right to a prompt
public trial by jury with the right to confront and cross-examine the
accuser and witnesses.57 Those rights of the accused are vital, and the
concern is understandable. However, those same rights are
recognized in civilianist jurisdictions under the rubric of "droits de la
défense" and thus are part of the general principles of law, a source
of binding international law. France incidentally shared the U.S.
concern over the absence of a mens rea requirement.58 Consequently,
the "Elements of Crimes" were amended to include a requirement of
culpa, i.e. mens rea.59 Similar U.S. procedural guarantees (e.g., nulle
crimen sine lege) were also written into the text of the Rome

53

Id. at x.
E.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 180-81.
55
Olsen, supra note 22, at xii (stating that "[t]wo main constitutional
objections to the Rome Statute have been raised: 1) the ICC does not offer the
same due process rights as does the U.S. Constitution; and 2) ratification would
contravene Article 1, Section 8 and Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution,
dealing with the establishment of domestic courts.").
56
Scheffer, supra note 3, at 17.
57
Lim, supra note 20, at 452; Kristafer Ailslieger, Why the United States
Should Be Wary of The International Criminal Court: Concerns Over Sovereignty
and Constitutional Guarantees, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 80, 94 (1999), available at
http://www.washburnlaw.edu/wlj/39-1/articles/ailslieger-kristafer.pdf.
58
John D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept
of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. R. 57
(2004).
59
Lim, supra note 20, at 458.
54
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Statute.60
Thus, general claims that the Rome Statute somehow
contradicts the U.S. Constitution are without merit and can be easily
met, legally speaking.61 Laws are presumed to be consistent with
each other and are so interpreted. Even when laws manifestly
conflict in theory, a law will be upheld as constitutional unless it is in
fact applied unconstitutionally; moreover, where a law is in fact
unconstitutional and applied unconstitutionally the doctrine of
severability indicates that a court ruling that two laws are in conflict
will delimit its decision as narrowly as possible so as to leave as
much as possible of both laws intact. Thus, the constitutional
objections to the ICC are ill-founded.
1.

Jurisdiction by the ICC Over U.S. Citizens and on U.S.
Territory

One of the express reasons the U.S. decided not to ratify the
Rome Statute was the fear that ratification would expose U.S.
soldiers and the U.S. government to frivolous62 political prosecutions
before the ICC.63 Unlike most other States, the U.S. provides large
numbers of troops, supplies, and support for international peacekeeping and peace-making operations, which other states cannot or
will not provide.64 Thus, the U.S. is more exposed to the ICC than
most other countries in this regard. At the same time, there are
definite instances of U.S. abuses, which would be violations, notably
by private military contractors.65 While isolated U.S. military abuses
of human rights are cases of "bad apples," i.e. of individual acts, and
60

A. Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144–171 (1999), available at
http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=570&issue=43.
61
Riggio, supra note 2, at 109.
62
Council on Foreign Relations, Should the United States Support a Strong
and Independent International Criminal Court? (Discussion Round-Table May 5,
1998), available at
http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/should-unitedstates-support-strong-independent-international-criminal-court/p49.
63
Zwanenburg, supra note 1, at 126.
64
Id.
65
Whitten, supra note 11, at 503.
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not of government policies, the fact is that the U.S. has engaged in
torture of captured terrorists as a state policy. So, while military
prosecutions might never occur before the ICC, the same might not
be said of the CIA or its independent contractors. We should never
forget that the U.S. has also committed war crimes such as the My
Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and the Abu Ghraib prison
abuse after the Iraq war. Nazis were not the only people to use
humans for deadly medical experimentation; the U.S. also conducted
deadly experiments on human test subjects; but the U.S. test subjects
poisoned with plutonium did not even know they were being used as
lab rats.66 Exposing criminals to liability for their criminal acts is the
nature of justice. However, the Rome Statute permits States to
invoke a national security exemption to their cooperation. Thus, the
critique that ratification of the Rome Statute may result in the ICC
having a form of “universal jurisdiction”67 over actions by U.S.
citizens in the United States68 is not well founded. Furthermore, if
there were any such conflict the time to address that conflict would
be when it arises in the concrete case, not as an abstract (and frankly
very unlikely) theoretical possibility.
As a factual matter it is extremely unlikely that CIA agents or
contractors will ever even be accused of crimes let alone convicted,
whether before the ICC or U.S. courts. The question is whether the
U.S. thinks the trade-off of increased legitimacy and effective
foreign policy in the real world is worth the risk of theoretical
liability. Given that the U.S. is over ten years and counting into a
"global war on terror" with a resulting massive debt and
underperforming economy, the calculus should be obvious. The
substantive crimes, except perhaps aggression, are already illegal
under U.S. military law.69 U.S. ratification of the ICC treaty (the
Rome Statute) would have positive effects in terms of affirming the
rule of law and restoring the United States as champion of human
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rights, the “heroes of Nuremberg”.70 It would strengthen
multilateralism, improving the U.S. position in the global struggle
against poverty, lawlessness, and the resultant terrorism.
2.

Ratification of the ICC would be Constitutional

U.S. case law makes it fairly clear that ICC ratification would
be constitutional. Ross v. McIntyre71 holds that U.S. constitutional
guaranties in the international context are proportional to actual
exercise of U.S. state power and the practical exigencies of
diplomacy. Neely v. Henkel72 makes it even clearer that the U.S.
constitutional guarantees are conditioned in the international context
by the treaty power. So, for example, it is constitutionally
permissible for the U.S. President via a ratified treaty to arrogate to
exclusive federal control an area of concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction (State of Missouri v. Holland).73 Thus, the constitutional
constraints on U.S. foreign policy are simply not sufficient to warrant
claims that the ratification of the ICC would be unconstitutional. The
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, may
constitutionally employ the treaty power to shape U.S. international
obligations a fortiori because the U.S. President is plenipotentiary in
foreign relations.
a.

Reservations

Usually a reservation to the treaty would allow the U.S. to
insulate itself constitutionally by affirming that the treaty shall not be
interpreted or applied as inconsistent with any provision of the
United States constitution. However, the Rome statute explicitly
forbids reservations.74 Instead, it allows "declarations." Usually the
term "declaration" is not a binding positive rule that may be applied
to cases; rather, declarations are mere political assertions. As such
they are not binding law on future cases. For example, the French
70
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Declaration of the Rights of Man was a political (and thus nonjusticiable) document. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man
was never seen as creating justiciable legal rights or duties. Likewise,
the U.S. Declaration of Independence was a mere assertion, not a
legally operative command or general rule; it was a political
declaration, not a legally justiciable instrument. The U.S. Declaration
of Independence is only of interpretative value, and like the preamble
to the U.S. Constitution or the German fundamental law, it does not
itself create positive rights and duties. It merely confirms other
existing rights and duties and guides their interpretation. Thus,
relying on "declarations" in the Rome Statute to address U.S.
concerns is a weak argument.
b.

Complementarity

The ICC is a court of “last resort.”75 The principle of
complementarity76 guarantees that the ICC shall only be resorted to
after exhaustion of local remedies at the State level: "the Court's
authority is only exercised when a nation is unable or unwilling to
independently investigate and prosecute an alleged crime . . . the
Rome Statute denies the ICC jurisdiction if, after expressing its
intent to investigate a suspect, the suspect's country pushes forth with
an investigation on its own."77 The principle of complementarity has
proven itself in practice and should allay any concerns over the
legality of the ICC.
c.

The American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA)

During the first term of the President George W. Bush, the
U.S. sought to oppose and avoid the ICC, notably by passing the
American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA) and by
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seeking bilateral non-prosecution agreements.78 This policy proved
ineffective at securing U.S. interests, so the U.S. no longer pursues
so-called Article 98 agreements.79 However, "if the United States
decides to cooperate with the ICC, the President will have to provide
a waiver under ASPA’s section 2003(c) or employ ASPA’s section
2015 in order to do so."80
E. Summation: International Relations "Realism"
Most of the critiques of the ICC81 are proposed by people
who advocate a flawed theory - international relations "realism" (“IR
Realism”). IR Realism is the idea that States are rational power
maximizers motivated by their own interest, which is defined in
terms of national security, i.e. Realpolitik. The principal architect of
the self-destructive U.S. efforts to oppose the United States inspired
ICC, John Bolton, argues that “[w]hy should anyone imagine that
bewigged judges in The Hague will succeed where cold steel has
failed? Holding out the prospect of ICC deterrence to the weak and
vulnerable amounts to a cruel joke.”82 Bolton, like most IR "realists,”
short-sightedly failed to consider the persuasive power of attractive
rules; we obey laws, and ensure that others obey them too, because
they are attractive to us and in our own interest, they guarantee our
well being. IR "realists" such as Bolton also underestimate or even
ignore the productive synergies generated by multilateralism due to
network effects, economies of scale, and reduced transaction costs.
The literal bankruptcy of realism as a foreign policy is demonstrated
from the fact of the failure of the various "wars against terror" to do
other than generate a massive budget deficit. Thus:
“By the time the U.S. came under severe pressure
78
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to drop its proposal for an ad hoc ‘Sudan Tribunal’ to
handle what it termed the ‘genocide’ in Darfur, it was
clear that the U.S. hostility towards the ICC was not
achieving it purpose. Far from undermining the ICC,
the Bolton-inspired policies appeared to enhance its
credibility.”83
This explains why the U.S. is pivoting from a policy which
opposed the ICC it inspired toward one of active cooperation with
the ICC.
III. U.S. Cooperation with the ICC: Observer Status and
Constructive Engagement
The U.S. is successfully pivoting from a foolish and selfdestructive policy of unilateralist confrontation to a nuanced sensible
policy of multilateral cooperation with the ICC:
[R]atification would directly advance U.S. national
security interests. The International Criminal Court
could strengthen America's efforts in stabilizing postconflict regions as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia did in the Balkans. ... by
working with the ICC, the United States would have
additional diplomatic tools in dealing with countries
such as Sudan, where the use of force may not be
“politically or practically feasible.84
A U.S. dignitary stated: “Our long-term vision is the
prevention of heinous crimes through effective national law
enforcement buttressed by the deterrence of an international court.”85
The United States has had and will continue to have a compelling
83
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interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court (ICC).86 Although the United States did not ratify the Rome
Statute, it is an observer thereto87 and has committed itself to help
countries to establish legal infrastructure needed for domestic
prosecutions and to cooperate with the ICC investigation of the
Lord's Resistance Army (“LRA”) in Africa.88 The current
administration recognizes that "[t]he United States has had and will
continue to have a compelling interest in the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court (ICC)"89 and supports the ICC
efforts in Libya and Darfur.90 For its part the EU is seeking to engage
the U.S. into participation in the ICC.91 One can envision the
progressive realization of the ICC Rome Statute into customary
international law as well as an eventual U.S. ratification of the ICC
Statute.
However, if the U.S. does not ratify the ICC Rome Statute,
are there other alternatives to the problems of violations of
international law?
IV. Alternatives to the ICC
Given that the U.S. has not yet ratified the Rome Statute of
the ICC, we can still fairly ask about alternatives and work-arounds
to that gap in global governance; U.S. non-participation in the ICC is
not as problematic as the U.S. decision not to join the League of
Nations but should be seen similarly: as an offer of a free-pass for
dictators and tyrants which may well lead to avoidable wars and lost
global productivity.
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A. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
Whether as an alternative or as a complement to criminal
prosecutions, truth commissions seek to establish what really
happened so that the victims and society can move on from the crime
to attain some semblance of a normal stable and productive life.92
One goal of international criminal law is reconciling conflicting
parties so that they can escape their conflict and enter into productive
peaceful relations.93 Obviously, truth and reconciliation commissions
cannot do all that is needed, but they will equally be appropriate in
certain times and places. The Rome Statute may even evolve to
account for the possibilities of truth and reconciliation commissions.
B. Tribunals
The predecessors to the ICC were the various international
tribunals, such as the IMTs at Nuremburg94 and Tokyo, and after the
Cold War, the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).95 That the U.S. was behind those
efforts was evident and that the U.S. should be a staunch supporter of
the ICC is a logical extrapolation from history.96 International
Tribunals were not, however, used in Iraq after the Second Gulf War.
While some called for the ICC to be invoked in Iraq, neither Iraq nor
the United States has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.97 Saddam
Hussein was eventually tried by a court established by the
provisional government of Iraq, not the ICC, in a trial that has been
92
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criticized by various human rights organizations (notably Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International). Nor were international
tribunals used in Sudan.98
Why resort to international tribunals? Are national courts
sufficient, or even more effective? Generally that may be the case,
but exceptionally it is certainly not the case, as can be seen in the
case of Iraq where the national tribunal has been characterized as
procedurally unfair due to bias. The advantage of international
instances over national courts is that the judges in such cases are
impartial, as they are not members of any of the conflicting
factions.99 Further, international proceedings garner greater publicity,
and thus will have greater deterrent effect than purely national
proceedings.100 Moreover, international crimes concern issues of
mutual and not merely several concern, affecting the entire world,
which legitimates the application of international criminal law.101
If international tribunals are good, why have an ICC?
Although international tribunals are good, they are not good enough.
The trouble with tribunals is that they are temporary and thus their
legitimacy and long-term contribution to the formation of
international law is questionable.102 "A permanent international
criminal court would additionally eliminate the need to invest in the
establishment of ad-hoc tribunals anytime a post-conflict
investigation is mandated."103
C. Current Events: Arab Spring and the ICC
The historic experiences with international tribunals and the
ICC set the stage for the reactions to the "Arab Spring." One can
rightly ask how international law will and should react to the
problems of governance presented by revolutionary reactions
instigated by outside powers to authoritarian governments?
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Libya

Libya may be a hopeful sign. Libya is not a state party to the
Rome Statute.104 While Russia clearly opposed the misuse of the
U.N. Security Council Resolution as a justification for armed
intervention into Libya, Russia nonetheless supported the U.N.
Security Council referral of Libyan cases to the ICC. “The U.K.,
France, Germany and U.S. spent eight hours overcoming opposition
in the council by several countries to the ICC referral.”105 Thus, the
ICC, on referral106 from a unanimous U.N. Security Council107 issued
a request for an arrest warrant against Kadafi108 and the ICC
Prosecutor opened an investigation into the crimes committed by the
Libyan government,109 accusing the Libyan leaders110 of "planning
and implementing 'widespread and systematic attacks against a
civilian population, in particular demonstrators and alleged
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dissidents'"111 - basic violations of the right to life.112
2.

Syria

Russia and the U.S. were both willing to invoke the ICC in
the case of Libya. The U.S. will very likely be at least as willing to
invoke the ICC in the eventual cases that will arise out of the events
transpiring in Syria. One can, however, wonder how Russia would
react to a request for referral by the ICC regarding cases in Syria.
Russia has steadfastly resisted any effort to oust Syria's leader Assad:
"Many thousands of people have died in Syria since the uprisings
began in March last year. Yet despite months of discussions, the
Security Council Member States have failed to agree on a solution.
The ceasefire plan sponsored by former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has proved an unmitigated failure, leading to his resignation,
while Russia and China continue to block efforts to refer the matter
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or launch military
intervention."113 The U.S. clearly wants to hold the Assad regime
criminally liable. [Former] "Secretary Clinton has said, 'there must
be accountability for senior figures of the regime.'"114 However,
without Russian support, or at least abstention, it is unlikely that an
ICC referral would issue from the Security Council. Part of the
negotiation of the transition in Syria should include the question of
whether and how to invoke the ICC.
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Conclusion
As seen, the United States has much to gain and little to risk
by deepening its connection to the ICC. Unless the U.S. ratifies the
Rome Statute it will be dependent on the Security Council for
referrals; since Russia or China could veto referral from the Security
Council, it is in the U.S. interest to ratify the ICC despite any
theoretical risk to CIA personnel or CIA contract employees. By
working its way deeper into the ICC machinery, the U.S. has the
chance to legitimize its foreign policy as multi-lateralist, pro-human
rights, and to present the Putin government with a challenge to the
"race to the top" model for the industrializing world to emulate.
While Obama and Putin alike may see the opportunity, will they
seize it – as they did in Libya? To some extent this depends on the
ability of "the President's Men" to Swallow hard and stand fast.
Senior level personnel in the CIA actively opposed the use of torture
(unlike extraordinary rendition) because torture generates false leads,
bad intelligence, and encourages enemy resistance. Abduction is not
always torture and not all interrogations were torture. Professional
intelligence personnel should interpose that objection to any claims
of wrong-doing as an exculpating and/or mitigating factor, were they
ever to be held accountable (which they most likely never will be) c'est la guerre.

